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Abstract
Electronic voting has attracted much interest recently and a variety of schemes have been
proposed. Generally speaking, all these schemes can be divided into three main approaches:
based on blind signature, based on mix networks and based on homomorphic encryption.
Schemes based on blind signature are thought to be simple, efficient, and suitable for large
scale elections. Fujioka, Okamoto and Ohta introduced a scheme typical of this approach in
1992. This scheme achieved a number of attractive properties, however, it did not provide
receipt-freeness and public verifiability. Later, Okamoto extended this work to provide receipt-
freeness and public verifiability, but the later work lost a useful property of the original scheme:
each voter can only verify the ballot recording process but not the ballot counting process any
more. In this paper, we propose a simple and efficient method, applying the secret ballot
technique introduced by the Preˆt a´ Voter scheme to improve individual verifiability to the
later work. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the only receipt-free scheme in which
voters can verify both the ballot recording process and the ballot counting process, and our
scheme provides some mechanisms for honest voters to accuse dishonest authorities during the
election process.
1 Introduction
Electronic voting has attracted much interest recently and a variety of schemes have been intro-
duced. Some papers [14, 13] give a good general introduction to different e-voting approaches,
their mechanisms, security requirements, and so on. In this paper, we will not repeat them, but
only focus on three security properties, receipt-freeness, individual verifiability and no-cheating,
which are the focus of this paper.
Receipt-freeness is related to privacy, but it is much stricter than privacy. It ensures that even
if a voter wants to, he can not show others how he voted. Privacy and receipt-freeness guarantee
that the voters can vote without coercion. Our definition of individual verifiability is stricter
than in most existing schemes (except [5]). We require that the system could not only allow each
voter to verify whether her ballot is correctly recorded as intended, but also whether her ballot
is correctly counted as recorded. If honest voters find out that some authorities are cheating
in the election process, the no-cheating property ensures the system provides voters with some
mechanisms to accuse the cheating authorities. But dishonest voters cannot successfully accuse
honest authorities.
Electronic voting schemes based on blind signature [5, 20, 21, 19] are thought to be simple,
efficient, and suitable for large scale elections. The involved parties in these schemes are the voters,
the administrator, the counter and the bulletin board. The main process is as follows: at first, a
certain voter generates her ballot form with her choice v, encrypting it by bit-committment {v}k
and blind signature {{v}k}blind. Then she sends it to an administrator. The administrator will
only sign the ballot if this voter is eligible and has not applied before. When the voter receives
the signed ballot {{{v}k}blind}sign from the administrator, she will unblind it {{v}k}sign and send
it to the counter anonymously through an anonymous channel. Normally, the anonymous channel
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is implemented by mix networks. As follows, the counter checks whether the ballot contains the
administrator’s signature. If yes, the counter will put it {v}k onto a bulletin board which can be
read by everyone, otherwise, he will reject this ballot. Now, the voter can verify whether her ballot
{v}k is correctly displayed on the bulletin board. If no, she can accuse the counter to a trusted
third party. Otherwise, she will send her de-committment key k to the counter anonymously after
some designated time T . Finally, the counter decrypts each ballot v and put them onto the bulletin
board.
Compared to the other two approaches, e-voting schemes based on blind signature have several
advantages: first, before the voter sends the de-committment key to the counter, the fairness and
voter’s privacy are unconditionally maintained even if all authorities colluded together. Second,
the scheme introduced by Fujioka et al. [5] can let voters not only verify the ballot recording
process but also the ballot counting process. And to the best of our knowledge, it is the only
existing scheme which achieves our definition of individual verifiability, but it has not achieved
receipt-freeness and public verifiability.
However, in blind signature based schemes, the voter has to be there during the whole election
process. Besides, if the anonymous channel is implemented by mix networks, the communication
and computation complexity will be another disadvantage.
In all receipt-free election schemes, the receipt-freeness is achieved by the assumption of an ex-
isting untappable channel which is a physical apparatus by which voters and voting authorities can
communicate, perfectly secure from all other parties. The voting booth and some tamper-resistant
techniques can be considered as untappable channels as well. Hirt and Sako [8] suggest that an
untappable channel from voting authorities to voters has the weakest physical assumption. How-
ever, in all e-voting schemes based on blind signature, receipt-freeness is achieved by untappable
channels from voters to voting authorities.
Although the receipt-free property has been achieved in a lot of schemes, in most of these
schemes, there are two conflicts that have not been solved.
• The first conflict is between individual verifiability and receipt-freeness. In most of the
receipt-free schemes, the system only allows the voters to verify the ballot recording process
but not the ballot counting process. This is not enough, the ballots can be altered during
storage or transit, and they could be lost or left out of the tally [18]. The reason of this
conflict is that if the voter can verify her result directly and has some proof to accuse the
dishonest authority, the voter can also prove the proof to coercers and let them to verify her
result as well. Therefore, receipt-freeness is violated. Recently, some schemes [8, 16, 15, 14]
have tried to use non-transferable proof, such as Designated Verifier Proofs [12]. However,
the proof in these schemes can only be used to verify the ballot recording process. The ballot
counting process can only be ensured by public verifiability.
• The second conflict is between receipts and receipt-freeness. Most of the latest schemes
suggest providing each voter with a receipt. It can not only make the voter feel more confident
about the election system but also give the voter a mechanism to accuse the authority if the
authority is cheating. However, in most of the election schemes based on mix networks and
homomorphic encryption, the receipt can only be used to verify the ballot recording process.
Besides, the voter’s privacy and receipt-free properties can be violated if the voter shows the
receipt and all the authorities are colluding together.
In this paper, we will propose a simple and efficient method to improve individual verifiability
to the scheme [20], meanwhile maintaining all other security properties. Our work is similar to
[20], by using trap-door bit-commitment. But our work is superior to [20] in two aspects. First,
our scheme does not suffer the flaw of [20], which has been fixed by [21]. In the scheme [20], the
coercer can force the voter to use some special parameters that the ballot can only be opened in
one way. As a result, the receipt-freeness is violated. Second, our scheme solves the two conflicts
introduced above by applying the secret ballot technique in Preˆt a´ Voter [3] scheme.
Our scheme allows each voter to verify not only the ballot recording process but also the ballot
counting process without violating the receipt-freeness property. Moreover, our scheme can provide
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some mechanisms to let honest voters accuse dishonest authorities during the whole election process
but dishonest voters cannot successfully accuse honest authorities. The receipt-freeness property
of our scheme is achieved by the assumption of two-way untappable channel between voters and
the administrator and one-way untappable channel from voters to the counter.
2 Anonymous Channel by Mix Networks
In our proposal scheme, the anonymous channel is implemented by mix networks. The concept
of mix networks was first introduced by Chaum in [2] and was followed by a number of schemes,
such as [10, 9, 1, 17, 11, 6, 18, 7]. Mix-net is a cryptography construction that enables one or
more mix servers to take a sequence of encrypted input messages, re-encrypt or decrypt them, and
output them in an unrevealed, randomly permuted order [17]. In theory, if there is one honest mix
server, the permutation links are kept secure. Generally speaking, mix networks can be divided
into re-encryption mix-net and decryption mix-net. Both can be used to provide an anonymous
channel.
2.1 Anonymous Channel by Re-encryption Mix-Nets
Our proposed re-encryption mix network is illustrated as Figure 1. The original ballots are all
encrypted under the same ElGamal public key y. Each mix server is required to perform two
re-encryption. For each re-encryption, mix servers first re-encrypt a list of ElGamal encrypted
ciphertexts {E1, E2, . . . , En} and randomly permute them, then output them as another list of
ElGamal encrypted ciphertexts {E′1, E′2, . . . , E′n}. Therefore, after re-encryption mix networks, the
final threshold authorities in possession of the ElGamal secret key x can decrypt all the ballots.
Figure 1: Mix Networks
When auditing whether mix servers have performed correctly in the re-encryption process, we
can audit each mix server one by one by using Randomized Partial Checking [11]. Recently, Golle et
al. [7] has introduced a new method which can dramatically increase the efficiency in the auditing
process. Instead of encrypting message m directly as E(m, t) = (α, β) = (myt, gt), each voter has
to encrypt the ballot in three steps:
• Compute hash checksum: compute h = H(α, β)
• Double encryption: choose r1, r2 ∈R Zq; E(α, r1); E(β, r2)
• Encrypt h: choose r3 ∈R Zq; E(h, r3)
By doing this, the complexity of ballot generation and re-encryption has increased. But the whole
re-encryption mix-nets can be verified more efficiently. If more than one mix servers cheat in
the mix-nets, the ballot value can not hold to the checksum hash value after decryption. Then
the threshold authorities in charge of decryption can detect cheating. If this happens, Schnorr
Identification Algorithm [22] or Fiat-Shamir heuristic [4] can be implemented with Randomized
Partial Checking [11] to audit each mix server one by one.
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2.2 Anonymous Channel by Decryption Mix-Nets
Generating anonymous channel by decryption mix-nets is similar. The whole decryption mix-nets
can also be illustrated by Figure 1. However, the ballots are not encrypted under the public key of
ElGamal encryption. Instead, the ballots are encrypted under each mix server’s public key, from
the last mix server to the first mix server. The original ballots can be illustrated as follows:
{r2k−1, {r2k−2, . . . , {r1, {r0,m}PK0}PK1 . . .}PK2k−2}PK2k−1
When decrypting, each mix server will first decrypt the input ballots by using her own secret key.
Then, throws away the random value. And as follows, permutates the outputs and put them onto
the bulletin board.
Randomized Partial Checking [11] can also be used to audit the decryption mix networks. But
the auditor can only audit each mix server one by one. When auditing, the mix server should
provide the random value, which she throwed away, to the auditor. And by using these random
values, the auditor can verify whether this mix server has performed correctly in the decryption
mix-nets.
2.3 Discussion of Re-encryption Mix-nets and Decryption Mix-nets
Anonymous channel can be generated by both re-encryption mix-nets and decryption mix-nets.
Re-encryption mix networks have several advantages to decryption mix networks:
• In re-encryption mix-nets, the re-encryption and decryption process are separated. Therefore,
the absence of one or more mix servers will not affect the correctness of mix networks. In
contrast, the absence of one mix server will make the decryption mix networks unusable, and
hence vulnerable to denial-of-service.
• In re-encryption mix networks, the auditing process is done by using zero-knowledge proof
such as Schnorr Identification Algorithm and Fiat-Shamir heuristic. The mix servers can be
verified without revealing the re-encrypt value r or the ballot information m. However, in
decryption mix-nets, the auditing process will more or less leak out some information.
• In re-encryption mix networks, the power of the decryption key can be distributed by using
threshold techniques. But in decryption mix-nets, the last mix server has too much power.
• Some latest schemes [6, 18, 7] have improved the efficiency of the auditing process for re-
encryption mix networks. But in decryption mix-net, to the best of our knowledge, the
auditor can only audit each mix server one by one.
However, re-encryption mix-nets have a big drawback. That is, when re-encrypting, the mix
servers can not use the same re-encrypt value to encrypt all the ballots, otherwise, the attacker
can easily find out all the permutation links between the inputs and the outputs. But if mix servers
use different re-encrypt values for each ballot, they have to remember all these re-encrypt values
because they have to use these value to prove they has performed correctly in the auditing process.
In large scale election, requiring all mix servers to remember such a great amount of random values
and their links to each ballot respectively is very impractical. In contrast, the decryption mix-nets
do not suffer such a drawback. The mix servers in decryption mix-nets do not need to remember
anything. All they need to do is to decrypt the input ballots again and they can recover all the
permutation links and every random value for each ballots.
3 Brief Introduction of [Oka96]
The parties involved in the scheme [20] are the voters, the administrator, the counter and the
bulletin board. The whole election process can be classified as the following five stages:
• Preparation Stage: a certain voter creates a ballotmi = BC(vi, ri) = gviGrii mod p, where
Gi = gαi mod p, hiding the choice vi by using trap-door bi-committment and blind signature
xi = H(mi||Gi)tei mod n, and then sends xi to the administrator.
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• Administration Stage: the administrator checks each voter’s eligibility, if a certain voter
is eligible and has not voted before, the administrator will sign her ballot yi = x
1/e
i mod n
and return yi to the voter.
• Voting Stage: when the voter receives the ballot signed by administrator, she will unblind
it si = yi/ti = H(mi||Gi)1/e mod n, and send (mi||Gi, si) to the counter anonymously.
• Ballot Recording Stage: the counter publishes all eligible ballots (m1,m2, . . . ,mk) onto
a bulletin board which can be read by every one. Each voter checks whether her ballot mi
is correctly recorded. If yes, she send the de-committment key (vi, ri,mi) to the counter
anonymously. Otherwise, she can accuse the counter to a trusted third party.
• Ballot Counting Stage: counter decrypts all the ballots (m1,m2, . . . ,mk) and publishes
the result (v′1, v
′
2, . . . , v
′
k) on the bulletin board. Also, the counter has to prove that she knows
(pi, ri) such that mi = BC(vi, ri) and v′i = vpi(i) without revealing (pi, ri).
The scheme [20] has achieved a lot of security properties such as completeness, uniqueness,
privacy, fairness, receipt-freeness and public verifiability. However, this scheme does not achieve
our definition of individual verifiability. It does not allow voters verify the ballot counting process.
4 Our Proposed Scheme
In this section, we will introduce our proposed scheme. The receipt-freeness of our scheme is
achieved by the assumption of two-way untappable channel between voters and the administrator
and one-way untappable channel from voters to the counter. We use the secret ballot technique
from Preˆt a´ Voter [3] to let only the voter verify whether her ballot is correctly counted in the final
tally.
Before election, the system parameters are generated and published by election authorities. Any
third party can verify whether the parameteres are satisfied. Suppose p and q are large numbers
where q|p− 1, and g is the order of Z∗p .
4.1 Preparation Stage
In this stage, suppose there are k voters (V1, V2, . . . , Vk) and 4 candidates with the names Alice,
Bob, Caroline and David respectively. As a result, by using cyclic shift, the candidate list has four
possibilities as shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Four possibilities of candidate list
A certain voter Vi creates a ballot by choosing vi, ui and ri, which are defined as follows: vi
is in {1, 2, . . . , m}, ui is in {0, 1, . . . , m − 1} and ri is a random number. m is the number of
candidates. In our case, there are 4 candidates, thus m = 4. The vi contains the voter’s choice. If
vi = 1, it means the voter want to vote for the first candidate Alice. If vi = 2, the candidate the
voter want to vote is the second one Bob, and so on. The ui means on the displayed candidate
list, the voter wants to read the result ui cyclic shift from the top. In other words, if ui = 0, then
the voter wants to read her result on the top row of the candidate list. If ui = 1, the voter wants
to read her result on the second row of the candidate list, and so on. The function of ri is to make
(vi, ui, ri) to be a trap-door bit-committment. For example, if a certain voter Vi wants to vote for
the fourth candidate David and she randomly decides to read the result on the second row of the
candidate list, she can choose vi and ui, such that vi = 4 and ui = 1.
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Each voter first creates a ballot BC(vi, ui, ri) in the following form:
mi = gvi+ui+ri mod p (1)
Therefore, even coercers know the information mi, they can not know in which way the voter will
open the ballot because the voter can open mi in a lot of ways such as (vi, ui, ri) and (v′i, u
′
i,
r′i) and so on. The voter just need to make sure that vi + ui + r1 ≡ (v′i + u′i + r′i) mod q. Define
Ri = gri mod p. As follows, similar to [20], the voter does the blind signature:
x1i = H(mi||Ri)tei mod n (2)
x2i = H(vi||ui||ri)tei mod n (3)
Here, ti is a random number in Zn and (e, n) is the public key of a RSA encryption. The
corresponding decryption key 1/e is hold by administrator A. Later, Vi signs x1i by using her own
secret key zi = sign(x1i). After that, Vi sends (x1i||x2i||zi||IDi) to the administrator A.
4.2 Administration Stage
A checks the eligibility of Vi. If Vi is not eligible or she has voted before, administrator A will reject
administrating this ballot, Otherwise, administrator A will sign the ballot by using her secret key
and send it back to the voter.
y1i = x
1/e
1i (4)
y2i = x
1/e
2i (5)
4.3 Voting Stage
When the voter Vi receive the signed ballot (y1i, y2i) from the administrator A, she can unblind
the ballot by s1i = y1i/ti = H(mi||Ri)1/e and s2i = y2i/ti = H(vi||ui||ri)1/e. Then Vi sends
(mi||Ri, s1i) to the counter anonymously through a proposed mix network as Figure 3.
Figure 3: Proposed Mix Networks
4.4 Ballot Recording Stage
The counter publish all the eligible ballot (m1,m2, . . . ,mk) in random order on to the bulletin
board. Each voter checks whether her ballot mi is correctly displayed on the bulletin board. If
not, Vi can use s1i = H(mi||Ri)1/e as a receipt to accuse the counter to a trusted third party.
4.5 Ballot Counting Stage
Define T is the deadline that every voter should verify the ballot recording stage. If Vi finds out
her ballot mi is correctly recorded on the bulletin board and the serial number of her ballot on the
bulletin board is l, then after the deadline T , Vi should send (l, vi, ui, s2i) to the counter through an
untappable anonymous channel (also by mix networks). By decrypting, the counter should display
the result in secret ballot form onto the bulletin board. The counter is not allowed to publish the
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s2i on the bulletin board but she has to record it in some place else. Otherwise, the receipt-freeness
property will be violated. At this moment, each voter can check whether the counter has displayed
her ballot result correctly. Only the voter can verify her own ballot but others can not verify this
ballot because they do not know the de-committment key (vi, ui, ri). Moreover, even if the voter
proves the coercer how she voted, the coercer will not trust her because she can cheat them by
using a different de-committment key (v′i, u
′
i, r
′
i). Therefore, the receipt-freeness is maintained.
For example, in our case, if Vi wants to vote for the fourth candidate David and she randomly
decides to read the result on the second row of the candidate list, she chooses vi = 4 and ui = 1
and then chooses ri randomly in the preparation stage. When the counter display the final result,
suppose the counter display the result as show in Figure 4, Vi can check whether the result in the
second row of the candidate list is her choice, David. But the result makes no sence to others.
Figure 4: Mix Networks and Result
4.6 No-cheating in our scheme
It is clear that in the whole election process, the authorities may cheat in administration stage,
ballot recording stage and ballot counting stage.
If the administrator cheats in administration stage, the ballot sent back from the administrator
will not contain the administrator’s signature. Then Vi can use IDi to accuse the administrator
to a trusted third party.
If the counter cheats in the ballot recording stage, recording the ballot incorrectly, then Vi can
use s1i = H(mi||Ri)1/e as a receipt to accuse the counter to a trusted third party.
If Vi finds our that the counter cheating in the ballot counting stage, she has two choice. One
is the election system can let Vi vote again without reason, then the previous vote will be deleted
and the system only deals with the new vote. By doing this, the voter’s privacy is maintained but
the voter can not accuse the counter. The other solution, if the voter wants to accuse the counter,
she has to violate her privacy. She can accuse the counter to a trusted third party with the help
of the administrator and there are three situations:
• First, it is clear that without colluding with the adminstrator, the counter can not fabricate
s′2i which contains the administrator’s signature. In other words, if the counter fabricate s
′
2i
without the administrator’s signature, the counter is cheating.
• Second, if the counter uses another received information s2j where i 6= j, and says it is s2i,
the administrator can prove that the counter is cheating because s2j does not belong to Vi.
• Third, if the counter shows the real s2i, Vi can open (vi, ui, ri) to show that the counter is
cheating. And because if the hash function is secure, Vi can not fabricate (v′i, u
′
i, r
′
i) to match
with the hash value s2i, so a dishonest voter cannot successfully accuse honest counter.
Therefore, honest voters can accuse a cheating counter, but dishonest voters can not successfully
accuse honest counters. The drawback is that if a honest voter accuses the cheating counter, her
privacy will be violated. The threat of our scheme is the same as other blind signature based
schemes. If the administrator collude with the counter, a lot of security properties will be violated.
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5 Conclusion
The main object of this paper is to introduce how to provide individual verifiability property to
the scheme [20], while maintain receipt-freeness. Most receipt-free election schemes based on blind
signature [20, 21, 19] are based on the assumption of one-way anonymous channel from the voter
to the counter, but because we wish to give each voter a mechanism to accuse the counter if
the counter is cheating in the ballot counting process, we also need the assumption of a two-way
untappable channel between the voter and the administrator to achieve receipt-freeness.
Our proposed scheme maintains all the properties of the scheme [20] except public verifiability.
But the method introduced in the scheme [20] can easily improve public verifiability to our scheme.
That is, the counter publishes two lists of result, one for individual verifiability and another one
for public verifiability. Also, she proves that she knows the links between the two lists without
revealing the links. For reason of space, we will not describe the detailed technique issues.
Note that the scheme Preˆt a´ Voter [3] does not achieve our definition of individual verifiability.
But we can use the same method introduced in this paper to provide individual verifiability to
[3] as well. The election authorities also need to display the result in secret ballot form. When
voting, the election system shows a cyclic clock from 1 to m which is the number of candidates. If
a certain voter wishes to read her result on the kth row in the candidate list, she input her choice
by clicking the DRE screen when the cyclic clock shows k. Therefore, the individual verifiability
property is achieved while maintaining receipt-freeness, only the voter can verify her own result.
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